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Recent research has documented that affect plays a crucial role in risk perception.
When no information about numerical risk estimates is available (e.g., probability of
loss or magnitude of consequences), people may rely on positive and negative affect
toward perceived risk. However, determinants of affective reactions to risks are poorly
understood. In a series of three experiments, we addressed the question of whether
and to what degree mental imagery eliciting negative affect and stress influences risk
perception. In each experiment, participants were instructed to visualize consequences
of risk taking and to rate riskiness. In Experiment 1, participants who imagined negative
risk consequences reported more negative affect and perceived risk as higher compared
to the control condition. In Experiment 2, we found that this effect was driven by affect
elicited by mental imagery rather than its vividness and intensity. In this study, imagining
positive risk consequences led to lower perceived risk than visualizing negative risk
consequences. Finally, we tested the hypothesis that negative affect related to higher
perceived risk was caused by negative feelings of stress. In Experiment 3, we introduced
risk-irrelevant stress to show that participants in the stress condition rated perceived
risk as higher in comparison to the control condition. This experiment showed that
higher ratings of perceived risk were influenced by psychological stress. Taken together,
our results demonstrate that affect-laden mental imagery dramatically changes risk
perception through negative affect (i.e., psychological stress).
Keywords: imagery, risk perception, affect, stress, emotions, blood pressure, risk-as-feelings hypothesis, risk
assessment
INTRODUCTION
Almost every day people face dilemmas, in which they have to decide about accepting or rejecting
risk. For example, they choose whether to drive unsafely in order not to miss the meeting,
whether to have sex with an unknown partner, whether to invest savings in volatile stocks, etc.
Theoretical models have postulated that the decision concerning risk acceptance might result
from risk perception in a way that increased perceived risk decreases the likelihood of engaging
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in a risky behavior and vice versa (e.g., Sarin and Weber,
1993). There is empirical evidence supporting these assumptions
(Weber and Milliman, 1997; Weber et al., 2002; Blais andWeber,
2006). However, there is also some disagreement concerning
the issue of which factors determine risk perception. Normative
decision models or axiomatic models of perceived risk assume
that risk assessment is based on the calculation of outcomes
and their probabilities (Neuman and Politser, 1992; Jia et al.,
2008), but in real-life situations quantitative information about
probabilities and consequences is rarely available or it is very
difficult to process. Therefore, perceived risk and risk-taking
behavior often result from people’s gut feelings (Bechara et al.,
1997; Wagar and Dixon, 2006), past experiences (Traczyk and
Zaleskiewicz, 2015), or anticipated emotions (Mellers et al.,
1999). People simply feel or intuitively experience the size of
a potential danger. The experimental project presented in this
paper indeed shows that negative affect and the state of stress
resulting from mental imagery might have a meaningful impact
on risk perception.
The role of emotions in both risk perception and risk taking
has been extensively studied in behavioral decision research
(Bechara et al., 1996; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Rottenstreich
and Hsee, 2001; Bechara, 2004; Slovic et al., 2007). For
instance, Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) argued that a combined
effect of anticipatory emotions (i.e., arising from considering
consequences) and incidental emotions (i.e., arising from factors
unrelated to the decision) influences decision making. More
specifically, Loewenstein et al. (2001, 270) postulated in their risk-
as-feelings model that “responses to risky situations (including
decision making) result in part from direct (i.e., not cortically
mediated) emotional influences, including feelings such as worry,
fear, dread, or anxiety.” Moreover, they assumed that some
emotional factors indirectly influence risky choices with only
little or even without cognitive control as in panic reactions to
threatening stimuli. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis posits that
one of the factors that is responsible for evoking strong risk-
related emotions is vividness. In other words, intense feelings
associated with risk perception might be produced by vivid
mental representations or visualizations of a risky situation.
This assertion seems to be supported by findings from cognitive
psychology showing that emotions are strongly related to mental
imagery (Kosslyn, 1994) and that imagining unpleasant events
leads to experiencing more anxiety (Holmes andMathews, 2005).
Results from studies conducted in the so-called psychometric
paradigm (see Slovic, 2000, 2013) also revealed a relationship
between mental imagery and risk acceptance in ecological and
financial domains (Peters and Slovic, 1996; MacGregor et al.,
2000; Peters et al., 2006). For example, people who produced
more negative images of risk showed a stronger risk-averse bias
(Slovic et al., 1991).
A more direct empirical test of the risk-as-feelings hypothesis
and its assumption that mental visualizations play an important
role in risk perception and risk acceptance has recently been
provided by Traczyk et al. (2015). These authors showed in a
series of experiments that imagining negative consequences of
risk elicits negative affect and feelings of stress, which in turn
decrease people’s willingness to engage in a risky behavior. The
present paper replicates and extends this work by showing that
the vividness and intensity of negative risk images influences
risk perception and that this relationship is mediated by negative
affect associated with feelings of stress. Experiments presented
in this article differ from previous research in at least three
ways. Firstly, using the experimental design we are now able
to directly test causal relationships between imagery, affect and
risk perception which was a main objective of Experiment
1. Secondly, we control task-involvement to report that it is
negative rather than positive affect that influences risk perception
(Experiment 2). Thirdly, we directly verify the hypothesis that
changes in risk perception are determined by stress, which does
not have to be related to a risky activity (Experiment 3).
The further part of this paper presents methods and results of
three experiments. Experiment 1 showed that imagining negative
consequences of risk produces negative affect, which, in turn,
increases perceived risk. Results of Experiment 2 documented
that imagining negative, but not positive, risk consequences is
responsible for the increase in perceived risk and that this relation
is mediated by negative affect. Finally, Experiment 3 revealed that
even incidental stress might have an impact on risk perception.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
One hundred and five unpaid volunteers (88 females; mean
age = 25.1 years; SD = 6.7) participated in this study.
Participants provided informed consent before the experiment.
The participation in this study was voluntary, anonymous, and
in agreement with the guidelines of the Ethical Committee.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to either experimental
or control conditions. In both groups, participants read brief
descriptions of five risky situations (e.g., “Ignoring persistent
medical problems”; see Table S1) randomly presented on the
computer screen. In the experimental condition, they were asked
to imagine and write down three possible negative consequences
of each risky situation. In the control condition, participants had
to solve three simple arithmetic problems (e.g., “17 − 5 = ?”)
instead of visualizing negative risk consequences. Each risky
situation was followed by six questions concerning: (1) emotions
evoked by negative risk consequences (three questions), (2)
risk perception (two questions), and (3) the intensity of mental
images of risk (one question; by asking about intensity, we
intended to measure the vividness of mental images of risk
and the strength of mental representation; words “intense” and
“vivid” are synonyms in the Polish language, so we might
have assumed that when participants rated images of risk as
more intense, they also rated them as more clear and vivid
at the same time). Responses to each question were provided
on a 10-point scale (the exact wording of these questions and
descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1). At the final stage of
the experiment, participants were asked to recall risky situations
presented in the study to check whether they were similarly
involved in the processing of risky situations regardless of the
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics for measures used in Experiment 1.
Item Negative Control
Mean SD Mean SD
Q1: Does this situation evoke negative emotions? (1—definitely no; 10—definitely yes) 6.08 1.64 4.85 1.94
Q2: Does this situation evoke fear? (1—definitely not; 10—definitely yes) 4.96 1.83 4.27 1.83
Q3: How intense emotions does this situation evoke? (1—very weak; 10—very intense) 5.03 1.68 4.60 1.75
Q4: I think that this situation is ... (1—not risky at all; 10—extremely risky) 7.13 1.02 5.66 2.12
Q5: Would you take such risk? (1—definitely not; 10—definitely yes) 4.29 1.65 5.09 1.80
Q6: Rate the intensity of your images of risk (1—not intense at all; 10—extremely intense) 6.02 1.62 4.79 1.99
Negative Affect (Q1, Q2, Q3) 5.36 1.57 4.57 1.69
Risk Perception (Q4, Q5) 5.71 0.80 4.57 0.95
Recall of Risky Situations (percent correct) 0.92 0.24 0.84 0.27
Study duration (in minutes) 13.84 7.42 6.88 2.60
condition (imagery vs. solving arithmetic problems). In this task,
five target and five distractor risky situations were displayed on
the computer screen in a randomized order, and participants
indicated which risky situation was actually shown to them in the
study.
Statistical Analysis
In each experiment, we fitted a linearmixedmodel using the lme4
(Bates et al., 2014) and the lmerTest packages implemented in the
R statistical environment (R Core Team, 2014). In each model,
risk perception was predicted by the experimental manipulation
(i.e., images of negative risk consequences vs. control) and
measures of evoked emotions. We also treated participants and
a risk domain as random-intercept effects, whereas emotions
were random-slope effects allowed to vary across participants and
different risk domains. To test the indirect effect between the
experimental manipulation and risk perception through changes
in emotions we constructed lower and upper limits of the 95%
confidence interval for the indirect path using the Monte Carlo
simulation method (Preacher and Selig, 2012) based on 10,000
random samples. If the confidence interval for the indirect effect
did not contain zero, we could conclude that the mediation effect
was significant (Hayes, 2013).
Results
Manipulation Check
We found that participants in the experimental condition rated
their mental images of risky situations as more intense than
controls, b = 1.23, p < 0.001 (see Table 1). Importantly, despite
it took more time to complete the whole procedure in the
experimental than in the control condition, t(103) = −6.478,
p < 0.001, we did not find differences between conditions in
terms of the accuracy of risky situation recall, t(103) = −1.636,
p = 0.105, implying that participants were similarly involved
in the processing of risky situations regardless of the condition
(imagery vs. solving arithmetic problems).
Testing for the Indirect Effect of Negative Affect
We averaged three measures of emotions in the way that higher
values indicated a more intense negative affect. Similarly, two
questions regarding risk were averaged to compute the risk
perception measure (i.e., higher values indicated that a situation
was perceived as more risky). We found that imagining negative
risk consequences (compared to the control condition) increased
both negative affect, a = 0.78, p = 0.015, and risk perception,
c = 0.64, p = 0.005. The indirect path through negative affect
was also significant, 95% CIs [0.08, 0.78], indicating that negative
affect mediates the relationship between imagining negative risk
consequences and risk perception (Figure 1).
Discussion
Experiment 1 demonstrated that imagining negative
consequences of risky activities elicits negative affect that,
in turn, leads to higher perceived risk. Importantly, we found
that there were no differences between the experimental and
control conditions in recalling risky situations which suggests
that differences in risk perception were due to mental imagery,
and not task involvement (i.e., participants from both conditions
were equally motivated and involved in processing risky
situations). In this sense, our findings are in line with previous
results showing that vividness and intensity of mental images
of negative risk consequences determine people’s willingness to
engage in risk-taking behavior (Traczyk et al., 2015). However,
the vital question that arises here is whether the effect is driven
solely by mental imagery or rather by negative affect elicited
by imagining negative risk consequences. We addressed this
question in Experiment 2, in which we modified the procedure
used before and asked participants assigned to the control
condition to visualize positive risk consequences (instead of
solving arithmetic problems). We hypothesized that situations
presented to participants would be perceived as more risky
because of negative affect elicited by mental images of risk
consequences rather than the intensity of mental imagery itself.
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Participants
One hundred and twenty-four unpaid volunteers (94 females;
mean age = 27.1 years; SD = 7.3) participated in this study.
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FIGURE 1 | Unstandardized coefficient for the indirect effect model in Experiment 1 predicting risk perception from negative affect evoked by
imagining negative consequences of risk. Monte Carlo 95% CIs for the indirect effect are based on 10,000 samples.
Participants provided informed consent before the experiment.
The study was voluntary, anonymous and in agreement with the
guidelines of the Ethical Committee.
Procedure
Participants assigned to the experimental condition were asked
to read, imagine and write down three negative consequences
associated with risk taking in five situations randomly presented
on the computer display. Differently than in Experiment 1,
participants in the control condition imagined positive risk
consequences of five risky situations instead of solving arithmetic
problems. Each risky situation was followed by six questions
concerning emotions evoked by negative risk consequences
(three questions), risk perception (two questions), and the
intensity of mental images of risk (one question). Responses
were provided on a 10-point scale (the exact wording of
these questions and descriptive statistics are presented in
Table 2). Similar to Experiment 1, at the end of this experiment
participants were also asked to recall risky situations presented in
the study.
Results
Manipulation Check
Intensity of mental images of risk consequences did not differ
between negative and positive imagery conditions, b = −0.13,
p = 0.641 (Table 2). Moreover, we did not find any significant
differences in the recall of risky situations, t(120) = 0.687,
p = 0.494, nor in time spent on completing the procedure,
t(122) = −0.949, p = 0.344, which suggest that participants were
equally involved in processing risky situations regardless of the
experimental condition (positive vs. negative risk consequences).
Testing for the Indirect Effect of Negative Affect
Similar to Experiment 1, three measures of emotions were
averaged in the way that higher values indicated more intense
negative affect. Two measures of the perceived risk were used
to compute the measure of risk perception (higher values
indicated higher perceived riskiness). We found that participants
who imagined negative consequences of risk, in comparison
to participants imagining positive risk consequences, reported
more negative affect, a = 2.58, p < 0.001, and rated risk as
higher, c = 0.71, p < 0.001. The indirect effect of risk images
through negative affect was also significant, 95% CIs [0.70,
1.42], demonstrating that negative images of risk consequences
(and not only the intensity of imagery) lead to increased risk
perception through negative affect (Figure 2).
Discussion
Experiment 2 showed that imagining negative, but not positive,
consequences of risk influenced risk perception. That is,
participants who visualized negative risk consequences rated
perceived risk as higher, compared to the control condition, and
this relationship was mediated by negative affect. Crucially, we
did not find any differences in either the recall of risky situations
or in the intensity of mental images of positive or negative risk
consequences. These results suggest that it is not the intensity of
mental imagery but rather negative affect that plays a key role in
risk perception.
However, a question arises of which negative feelings are
involved in this process? Is this negative affect or more complex
feelings associated with psychological stress? On the basis of
several previous studies (Lighthall et al., 2009; Porcelli and
Delgado, 2009; Buckert et al., 2014; Traczyk et al., 2015) we
argue that elevated perception of risk is likely to be driven
by the experienced stress. That is, negative feelings of stress
might serve as heuristic information leading to changes in the
perceived risk (Slovic et al., 2007). Experiment 3 attempted to
verify this hypothesis. We introduced the risk-irrelevant stress
manipulation (i.e., stress that is unrelated to a risky situation) and
expected that it would lead to higher ratings of perceived risk,
compared to the control condition.
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TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics for measures used in Experiment 2.
Item Negative Positive
Mean SD Mean SD
Q1: What kind of emotions does this situation evoke? (1—negative; 10—positive) 3.63 1.88 4.76 2.67
Q2: Does this situation evoke feelings of fear/hope? (1—definitely not; 10—definitely yes) 5.86 2.21 5.67 2.34
Q3: How intense emotions does this situation evoke? (1—very weak; 10—very intense) 5.60 2.61 4.01 2.81
Q4: I think that this situation is ... (1—not risky at all; 10—extremely risky) 7.11 2.27 7.19 2.29
Q5: Would you take such risk? (1—definitely not; 10—definitely yes) 4.02 2.65 4.81 2.82
Q6: Rate the intensity of your images of risk (1—not intense at all; 10—extremely intense) 6.07 2.32 5.94 2.35
Negative Affect (Q1, Q2, Q3) 2.74 3.22 0.16 3.40
Risk Perception (Q4, Q5) 6.55 2.15 6.19 2.20
Recall of risky situations (percent correct) 0.98 0.10 0.96 0.14
Study duration (in minutes) 10.04 13.35 15.28 41.37
Participants, when responding to Q3, rated the level of fear in the negative condition and the level of hope in the positive condition. To compute the overall measure of Negative Affect
(Q1, Q2, Q3) in the positive condition we inversely coded participants’ responses to Q3.
FIGURE 2 | Unstandardized coefficients for the indirect effect model in Experiment 2 predicting risk perception from negative affect evoked by
imagining negative consequences of risk. Monte Carlo 95% CIs for the indirect effect are based on 10,000 samples.
EXPERIMENT 3
Method
Participants
Thirty-two undergraduate students (16 females) aged 23.8 years
on average (SD= 7.2) participated in this study for credit points.
None of them had diagnosed arrhythmia or other cardiovascular
diseases. Participants were asked to restrain from physical
activity, smoking, drinking coffee or energy drinks, and eating
large meals for 2 h before the study. The study was voluntary,
anonymous, and in agreement with the guidelines of the Ethical
Committee.
Materials and Apparatus
The mental arithmetic task from the Trier Social Stress Test
(Kirschbaum et al., 1993) was used to experimentally increase
stress level. This task has been proven in earlier research to
raise both cardiac and salivary responses as well as self-reported
stress measures (Roy et al., 2001; Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004;
Gerin, 2011). Participants were presented with a four-digit
number (e.g., 1473) and then asked to cumulatively subtract
another two-digit number from it (e.g., 17). They were also
instructed to perform calculations aloud, as fast as possible and
without errors. Additionally, to intensify the manipulation effect,
participants were informed that the task would be performed
under time constraints and that their answers would be recorded
for subsequent video analysis. In the stress-induction condition
(i.e., the mental arithmetic task) the subtraction task with six
different sets of numbers was used, whereas in the control
condition participants had to count backwards from 10 to 1.
The effects of stress manipulation were tested by two
measures: (1) systolic and diastolic blood pressure were registered
with a digital blood pressure monitor TMA-880 (error +/−
3 mmHg) manufactured by TechMed R©, and (2) positive and
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TABLE 3 | Descriptive statistics for measures used in Experiment 3.
Item Stress induction Control
Mean SD Mean SD
Q1: Do you find this situation stressful? (1—definitely not; 10—definitely yes) 5.84 2.94 5.52 2.95
Q2: I think that this situation is ... (1—not risky at all; 10—extremely risky) 7.11 2.67 6.78 2.81
Q3: Would you take such risk? (1—definitely not; 10—definitely yes) 4.73 3.05 4.66 3.16
Risk Perception (Q2, Q3) 6.19 2.49 6.06 2.61
negative affect were measured with the Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988). This scale consists
of 20 adjectives describing different feelings and emotions.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a dimly-lit laboratory
room. Ten minutes of a relaxation stage preceded eight
measurements of baseline blood pressure taken at 30-s intervals.
Then, participants completed the brief PANAS scale in order
to assess their current emotional state. A within-subjects
manipulation was introduced and balanced in four blocks. Half
of participants started the experiment with two blocks of the
mental arithmetic task followed by two blocks of the backward
counting task. The order of these tasks was reversed in another
group of participants. After two blocks of the mental arithmetic
task, PANAS was administered again to control for the effects of
the experimental manipulation (i.e., stress induction procedure).
During each block three blood pressure readings were taken, after
which participants imagined consequences of eight or nine risky
situations randomly selected from a total number of 34 risky
situations covering different risk domains (the unequal number
of risky situations in each block was caused by the random
selection mechanism, i.e., the need to divide 34 situations into 4
blocks). Each situation was followed by questions regarding stress
(one question) and risk perception (two questions). The exact
wording of these questions and descriptive statistics are shown
in Table 3. The whole procedure lasted∼30 min.
Results
Data Reduction
Cardiovascular data were preprocessed in the following steps:
(adapted from: Traczyk et al., 2015): (1) twenty measurements
of systolic (SY) and diastolic (DY) blood pressure for each of
the participants were transformed into Mean Arterial Pressure
(MAP = 2/3∗DY + 1/3∗SY); (2) the first three measurements
from baseline (at the beginning of the study) were removed
from further analysis; (3) the remaining 17 measurements
were z-scored for each participant; (4) five measurements from
baseline were averaged to control for pre-test baseline level of
stress; (5) six averaged measurements from the mental arithmetic
and six averaged measurements from the control task served as
psychophysiological indicators of evoked stress.
Manipulation Check
The transformed blood pressure data was entered into a repeated-
measures ANOVA. The main effect of stress manipulation was
significant and relatively strong, F(1, 60) = 34.095, p < 0.001,
η
2 = 0.53. A post-hoc analysis with a Bonferroni correction
showed enhanced blood pressure in the stress condition
compared to both baseline and the control condition (ps <
0.001). No difference was found between baseline and the control
condition, p= 0.366 (Figure 3).
To assess how stress manipulation influenced the positive
and negative affect measured with PANAS, two t-tests were
carried out. Results indicated that experimental manipulation
with laboratory-induced stress led to an increase in negative
affect, t(31) = −3.215, p = 0.003. Changes in positive affect were
not significant, t(31) = 1.187, p= 0.224 (Figure 4).
Testing for the Indirect Effect of Stress
Similar to the two previous experiments, two measures of
the perceived risk were used to compute the measure of
risk perception (higher values indicated higher perceived
riskiness). Next, a mediation analysis, with self-reported
stress as a mediator between experimental manipulation
and risk perception, was performed (Figure 5). We found
that participants who experienced enhanced stress in the
experimental condition, compared to the control condition,
reported risky situations as more stressful, a = 0.31, p =
0.045. Stress manipulation, however, did not influence risk
perception directly, c = −0.11, p = 0.329. Crucially, the indirect
effect through reported stress level was significant, 95% CIs
[0.004, 0.330].
Discussion
Experiment 3 revealed that risk-irrelevant stress manipulation
influenced ratings of the stressfulness of a risky situation,
which, in turn, led to higher perceived risk. Moreover, results
showing enhanced blood pressure and increased negative affect
in response to the experimental manipulation allow us to
conclude that changes in risk perception are produced by feelings
of stress. These findings lend empirical support for theoretical
assumptions in the risk-as-feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein
et al., 2001). Specifically, we demonstrated that negative feelings
associated with stress might change people’s risk perception
(i.e., higher stress leads to higher ratings of risk). Crucially,
this experiment showed that stress does not have to be directly
related to risky activities. Instead, it can be evoked by a
completely different task and operate incidentally, influencing
risk perception.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
A growing body of evidence has been accumulated over the last
decade to demonstrate the crucial role of emotions in both risk
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FIGURE 3 | Mean blood pressure level (z-scored) as a function of
experimental task (i.e., pre-test baseline readings, control backward
counting task, and mental arithmetic task—stress). Error bars represent
95% bootstrapped CIs based on 1000 samples.
FIGURE 4 | Mean positive and negative affect measured by PANAS
questionnaire before and after stress induction procedure. Error bars
represent 95% bootstrapped CIs based on 1000 samples.
perception and risk taking (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Loewenstein
and Lerner, 2003; Lerner et al., 2004, 2015; Bechara and Damasio,
2005; Slovic et al., 2007). However, much less is known about
psychological determinants of people’s affective reactions to
risk. In this article, we argued that mental images of risk
consequences shape affective reactions to risky activities leading
to differences in risk perception. Results of three experiments
demonstrated that visualizing risk consequences elicits negative
affect associated with feelings of stress. Negative affect and stress,
in turn, lead to higher perceived risk. Crucially, risk perception is
influenced by negative rather than positive affect and this effect
is not driven by involvement in processing information about
risk.
Our findings provide support for the risk-as-feelings model
(Loewenstein et al., 2001), which posits that risk-taking behavior
results from feelings, and not only cognitive evaluation.
Specifically, we demonstrated that when no information about
numerical risk parameters is available (e.g., probability of loss or
magnitude of consequences), people rely on mental images of
risk consequences. The vividness and intensity of these images
produce affective reactions toward risk that change the way it
is perceived. However, because participants provided only very
brief reports of consequences (see Table S2), we cannot assess the
exact content of their mental images of risky situation (e.g., if
they are more abstract or concrete). Therefore, basing on these
data we are not able to definitely conclude, whether mental
representations of risk consequences were visual or prepositional.
Nevertheless, studying the content and exact representation of
mental images was not the purpose of our research project.
Moreover, the nature of affect investigated in this study
is not uniform. Therefore, it seems important to discuss the
distinction between the two types of affective influences on risk
perception. Firstly, ratings of negative affect that were measured
in Experiments 1 and 2 might be interpreted as an example of
anticipatory emotions that are integral to the risk perception
process. In other words, we assume that when people consider
their possible engagement in a risky activity, they anticipate
experiencing negative emotions (e.g., fear when imagining a car
crash as a consequence of a risky driving). Secondly, we have
also shown that risk perception might be influenced by incidental
negative affect. Specifically, participants who were under stress
unrelated to a risky activity rated perceived risk as higher than
participants assigned to the control condition. These findings
conform to some extent with the emotion-imbued model (Lerner
et al., 2015), which assumes that emotions felt at the time of
making the decision are constituted by both feelings integral to
a decision problem and incidental emotions that are unrelated to
it (Traczyk and Fulawka, 2016).
Despite different sources of affect were examined in this
study, we found a consistent pattern of results. Both anticipatory
emotions that were integral to a risky activity as well as incidental
stress made participants perceive risk as higher. Is it possible
that incidental and integral emotions lead to differences in risk
perception? Indeed, there is evidence for the emotion-specific
influence on risk perception. For example, Lerner and Keltner
(2000) reported that fear was associated with higher ratings of
risk, whereas anger was related to lower risk ratings. In our
study, imagining consequences of risk taking induced fear, but
in case of stress manipulation this issue appears to be more
complex. The question arises of which negative emotions might
have been elicited by the manipulation introducing incidental
stress in Experiment 3? For the purpose of this project, we
define psychological stress as “a state characterized by strong
negative emotions, such as fear, anxiety, anger, hostility, or other
emotional states evoking distress, accompanied by physiological
and biochemical changes that evidently exceed the baseline level
of arousal” (Strelau, 1995, p. 218). Following this definition,
in Experiment 3 we observed changes in the stress level,
which was operationalized as the increase in negative affect
(measured by PANAS) and the increase in the blood pressure
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FIGURE 5 | Unstandardized coefficient for the indirect effect model in Experiment 3 predicting risk perception from risk-irrelevant stress manipulation
and ratings of the risky situation’s stressfulness. Monte Carlo 95% CIs for the indirect effect are based on 10,000 samples.
level signifying enhanced arousal. Nonetheless, it is less clear
whether the task we used to induce stress (i.e., mental arithmetic)
elicited fear or rather anger (Moons et al., 2010). Both emotions
seem to be plausible. That is, some participants might have
experienced fear because they were afraid of making a mistake in
calculations, but we cannot exclude that they felt anger because
they could not have met the requirements of the task. This
problem seems to be worth investigating in future studies. For
example, other experimental tasks inducing stress such as the
cold pressor task (Lighthall et al., 2009; Porcelli and Delgado,
2009) might be used to test whether the effects of stress on
risk perception are independent from the sources of stressful
experiences.
In the present project we examined general psychological
processes that explain the affective bases of risk perception.
However, we also believe that theoretical models that aspire to
describe the effects of emotions on risk perception and risk-
taking should consider the individual-differences factor as a
potential moderator of these relationships. For example, despite
numerous studies demonstrating that fearfulness, trait-anxiety,
and emotional reactivity moderate the impact of emotions on
cognitive processes including decision making (de Visser et al.,
2010; Strelau and Zawadzki, 2011; Hartley and Phelps, 2012;
Paulus and Yu, 2012; Xu et al., 2013; Matusz et al., 2015),
understanding the moderating role of individual differences
in the relationship between emotions and risk perception still
requires further investigation (for a notable exception see Lerner
and Tiedens, 2006).
To summarize, we demonstrated that imagining negative
consequences of risk elicits negative affect that leads to higher
perceived risk. Importantly, the observed effects are driven by
psychological stress that exerts an influence on risk perception
even when it is not directly related to a risky activity. Findings of
this project suggest that affect-laden imagery producing negative
affect and feelings of stress may determine our reactions to
risk when no information about numerical risk estimates is
provided.
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